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Abstract 
Self-serving, rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit. The 
two-player iterated prisoner’s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of 
cooperation. It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a 
player can control the return of the other participants. The recent discovery of the powerful 
class of zero-determinant strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma dramatically expands 
our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral 
advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents. However, strategies in the 
prisoner’s dilemma game are only two strategies. Are there these results for general 
multi-strategy games? To address this question, the paper develops a theory for 
zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games, with any number of strategies. The 
analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games. 
Zero-determinant strategies in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma can be seen as degenerate case 
of our results. The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game, the Hawk–Dove game and 
the Chicken game. 
 
Keywords: Prisoner’s Dilemma; Zero-Determinant Strategies; multi-strategy game; 
symmetric game. 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Although a game theory is initially emerged as a branch of mathematics, it covers almost 
every aspect of human interaction, especially including the mutual influence and interaction 
between human behavior, the interests of competition and cooperation between people, and the 
most successful applications in economics. One of the most used in game theory is a prisoner's 
dilemma, it is proposed by Tucker, and the study of the prisoner's dilemma involves mathematics, 
economics, political science, ethics, psychology, computer science and other fields. The prisoner’s 
dilemma itself is well established as a way to study the emergence of cooperative behavior[1]. Each 
player is simultaneously offered two options: to cooperate or defect. If both players cooperate, 
they each receive the same payoff R; if both defect, they each receive a lower payoff P; if one 
player cooperates and the other defects, the defector receives the largest possible payoff T, and the 
cooperator the lowest possible payoff S. A dynamic iterated game is one of the newest directions 
in the studies of the game theory. Under the iterated game framework, the expected payoff of a 
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player is determined by the others. It is difficult that an unilateral participant tries to find a simple 
optimal strategy. In PNAS, zero-determinant (ZD) strategies discovered by Press and Dyson [2] 
have attracted considerable attention [3-6]. They show that a player adopting zero-determinant 
strategies is able to pin the expected payoff of the opponents. In particular, a player α  who is 
witting of these strategies can (i) deterministically set her opponent β ’s score, independently of 
his strategy or response, or (ii) enforce an extortionate linear relation between her and his scores 
[2]. Despite being not consistent with our intuition, it describes a beautiful outlook for the 
dynamic iterated game and also causes the much attention of many scientists [3-7]. Szolnoki and 
Perc [3] studied the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where 
besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are 
the five competing strategies. To explore the performance of ZD strategies against humans, Hilbe 
et al.[4] have designed an economic experiment in which participants were matched either with an 
extortioner or with a generous co-player. They show, although extortioners succeeded against each 
of their human opponents, extortion resulted in lower payoffs than generosity. Stewart and Plotkin 
[5] explored the evolutionary prospects for ZD strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Hilbe 
et al. [8] studied zero-determinant alliances in multiplayer social dilemmas. Zero-determinant 
strategies were also generalized for the iterated public goods game [9] and all symmetric 2x2 
games [10]. 
As mentioned above, however, these games are two-strategy games. One aim of this paper is 
to design a framework for zero-determinant strategies in iterated multi-strategy games. It is found 
by surprise that the ZD strategies still exist for a player with many strategies in two-player iterated 
games. In the first place we develop ZD strategies in iterated multi-strategy games and give a 
feasible condition of ZD strategies. In the second place we study the mechanisms of 
zero-determinant strategies in symmetric games and the mischief or the extortion of a player. 
Third, the results are applied to the Snowdrift game, the Hawk–Dove game and the Chicken game.  
 
2 Framework of zero-determinant strategies 
A multi-strategy game has the following two characteristics： 
(1) Letα andβ  denote player 1 and player 2, respectively. Both players have only a finite 
number of strategies. Assuming that there are n  strategies for player α , 
m ( nm ≤≤1 ) strategies for playerβ . Strategy sets are respectively represented as 
follows: },,,,{ 321 nS ααααα L= , },,,,{ 321 mS βββββ L= . 
(2) In each round game, if playerα and player β  use strategy iα and strategy jβ , 
respectively, then a game ),( ji βα  is formed. Suppose that playerα receives payoff 
ija and player β receives payoff jib , then the payoff matrix of player α  is  
mnijaA ×= ][ , the payoff matrix of playerβ is nmijbB ×= ][ .  
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The data of a finite two-person game can be summarized by two matrices. Two-person games 
with finitely many choices, like the one above, are also called matrix games since they can be 
represented by two matrixes. Usually, these matrices are written as one matrix with two numbers 
at each position. Therefore, such games are often called ‘bimatrix games’. The formal definition is 
as follows. A bimatrix game is a pair of n ×m matrices (A, B), where 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
== ×
),(),(),(
),(),(),(
),(),(),(
),(),(
2211
2222222121
1112121111
nmnmnnnn
mm
mm
mnijij
bababa
bababa
bababa
baBA
L
MLMM
L
L
.          (1) 
 
In iterated games, for playerα the possible outcome of each stage game can be represented 
as： mnji ×),( βα . 
For playerα , the conditional probability that in next game strategy kα  occurs given that 
current game ),( ji βα  has occurred is denoted by )(k jip βα . Therefore, the conditional probability 
vector is formed as follows  
nk
pppppppppp kkkkkkkkkk
mnnnmm
,,2,1
),,,,,,,,,,,,,( )()()()()()()()()()(
212221212111
L
LLLL
=
= βαβαβαβαβαβαβαβαβα .  (2) 
For playerβ the possible outcome of each stage game can be represented as: nmij ×),( αβ . 
For playerβ , the conditional probability that in next game strategy kβ  occurs given that 
current game ),( ij αβ  has occurred is denoted by )(k ijq αβ . Therefore, the conditional probability 
matrix is formed as follows 
mk
qqqqqqqqqq kkkkkkkkkk
nmmmnn
,,2,1
),,,,,,,,,,,,,( )()()()()()()()()()(
212221212111
L
LLLL
=
= αβαβαβαβαβαβαβαβαβ .     (3) 
We let p  and q  denote )1(p  and )1(q , respectively.  )(kp and )(kq  imply a Markov 
matrix whose stationary probability vector v, combined with the respective payoff matrices, yields 
an expected outcome for each player. With rows and columns of the matrix in α ’s order, the 
Markov transition matrix ),( qpP  from one move to the next is shown in Fig.1. 
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Fig. 1.  The Markov transition matrix ),( qpP . 
Because P  has a unit eigenvalue, the matrix IPP −≡' is singular, with thus zero 
determinant. The stationary vector v of the Markov matrix, or any vector proportional to it, 
satisfies 
vvP =      or       0'=vP .                  (4) 
 
The adjugate matrix of 'P  is as follows 
 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=
nmnmnmnm
nm
nm
PPP
PPP
PPP
PAdj
L
MLMM
L
L
21
22212
12111
)'( ,             (5) 
 
0' =−≡ IPP implying that 
0'')'( == IPPPAdj .                 (6) 
Based on the properties of the adjugate matrix and the stationary probability, every row of 
)'(PAdj  is proportional to v. Choosing the last row, we see that the components of v are (up to a 
sign) the determinants of the nm × nm matrices formed from the first nm-1 columns of 'P , leaving 
out each one of the nm rows in turn. These determinants are unchanged if the first column of 'P  
is added into the second column, and third column is added into the first column. 
The result of these manipulations is a formula for the dot product of an arbitrary nm-vector f 
with the stationary vector v of the Markov matrix, ),,( fqpDfv ≡⋅ , where ),,( fqpD  is  
the following determinant (see Fig.2). 
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Fig.2. Determinant ),,( fqpD  
This result follows from expanding the determinant by minors on its nm-th column and 
noting that the nm-1 × nm-1 determinants multiplying each if  are just the ones described above. 
What is noteworthy about this formula for v · f  is that it is a determinant whose second column, 
),,,,,,,,,1,,1( )1()1()1()1()1()1()1()1(
11221111111 mmnnmm
ppppppppp βαβαβαβαβαβαβαβα LLLLL +−−= ,    (7)   
is solely under the control of α ; whose first column, 
),,,1,,,,,1,,,1( )1()1()1()1()1()1()1()1()1()1(
212121211112111 nmnmnmmm
qqqqqqqqqqq αβαβαβαβαβαβαβαβαβαβ LLLLL −−−= +++ .  (8) 
is solely under the control of β ; and whose nm-th column is simply f. 
We rewrite the payoff matrix playerα  as follows vector form 
),,,,,,,,,,,( 212222111211 nmnnmm aaaaaaaaa LLLL=αω ,       (9) 
We also rewrite the payoff matrix playerβ  as follows vector form 
),,,,,,,,,,( 212222111211 mnmmnn bbbbbbbbb LLLL=βω .       (10) 
In the stationary state, their respective expected scores are the 
)1,,(
),,(
1 qpD
qpD
v
v αα
α
ωωϖ =⋅
⋅= ,                      (11) 
)1,,(
),,(
1 qpD
qpD
v
v ββ
β
ωωϖ =⋅
⋅= ,                      (12) 
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where 1 is the vector with all components 1. The denominators are needed because v has not 
previously been normalized to have its components sum to 1 (as required for a stationary 
probability vector). 
Because the scores in Eq. (11) and Eq.(12) depend linearly on their corresponding payoff 
matrices P , the same is true for any linear combination of scores, giving 
 
)1,,(
)1,,(
qpD
cbaqpD
cba
++=++ βαβα ωωϖϖ .             (13) 
where a , b and c  are constants. 
This equation (13) reveals the possible linear relationship between the players’ expected 
payoffs. Recalling that in the matrix 'P there exists a column p  totally determined by )1(p , or  
there exists a column q  totally determined by )1(q .  If α  chooses a strategy that satisfies  
1cbap ++= βα ωω ,                        (14) 
or if β  chooses a strategy with  
1cbaq ++= βα ωω ,                       (15) 
then the determinant vanishes and a linear relation between the two expected scores, 
0=++ cba βα ϖϖ ,                        (16) 
will be imposed. Since matrix 'P  is singular, the strategy p  which leads to the above linear Eq. 
(16) is a multi-strategy zero-determinant strategy of player α .  
Feasible condition.  Not all zero-determinant strategies are feasible, with probabilities p 
and q all in the range [0,1]. Whether they are feasible in any particular instance depends on the 
particulars of the application. A sufficient condition of feasible zero determinant strategies of 
multi-strategy games is as follows： 0
1
≠∑
=
nm
i
inmP , and either nmiPinm ,,2,1,0 L=≥  or 
nmiPinm ,,2,1,0 L=≤ . 
α Unilaterally Sets β ’s Score. Eq. (13) allows much mischief by choosing values 
a , b , c  that keep her strategy p as defined in Eq. (14) in the realm of possibility vectors, α  can 
unilaterally enforce certain constraints on the iterated game's expected scores. From the above, 
α may choose to set 0=a , yielding 
b
c−=βϖ . By doing so, she can unilaterally determine 
β 's expected payoff. 
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α Demands and Gets an Extortionate Share. Interestingly, α  may enforce a linear 
relation between her and β 's scores: α  may ensure herself a multiple of every surplus β  
earns over a certain offset. By setting  
Δ+−= )( bac , for any offset Δ ,                     (17) 
α  enforces  
)( Δ−=Δ− βα ϖλϖ .                        (18) 
For values λ > 1 such strategies could be described as enforcing an “unfair”, extortionate share of 
payoffs for α . 
 
 
3 Zero-determinant strategies of symmetric games 
The definition of symmetric games is as follows：The payoff matrix of player α  is 
nnijaA ×= ][ , while the payoff matrix of palyer β  is the transpose of A , that is, 
nnji
T aAB ×== ][ , then 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
== ×
),(),(),(),(
),(
),(
),(
),(),(),(
),(),(),(
),(),(),(
),(),(
23322211
33
22
11
333323321331
322322221221
311321121111
nnnnnnnn
nn
nn
nn
nnjiij
aaaaaaaa
aa
aa
aa
aaaaaa
aaaaaa
aaaaaa
aaBA
L
LLLLL
M
L
L
.   (19) 
 
If we assume that njiaaaa ijjijiij ,,2,1,),,(),( L== ，then matrix nnjiij aaBA ×= ),(),(  is 
symmetric. This is also our reason for calling it a symmetric game. For example, the prisoners’ 
dilemma, stag hunt and the game of chicken are symmetric games, which means that they can all 
be represented in a symmetric 22×  payoff matrix (see Eq.(20)) 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
),(),(
),(),(
PPST
TSRR
.                         (20) 
Let 
),,,,,,,,,,,,(
),,,,,,,,,,,,(
)1()1()1()1()1()1()1()1()1(
2)1(1)1(22121
212221212111 nnnnnn
ppppppppp
ppppppppp nnnnnnnnnn
βαβαβαβαβαβαβαβαβα LLLL
LLLL
=
+−+−++
, 
),,,,,,,,,,,,(
),,,,,,,,,,,,(
)1()1()1()1()1()1()1()1()1(
2)1(1)1(22121
212221212111 nnnnnn
qqqqqqqqq
qqqqqqqqq nnnnnnnnnn
αβαβαβαβαβαβαβαβαβ LLLL
LLLL
=
+−+−++
. 
We rewrite the payoff matrix playerα  as follows vector form 
),,,,,,,,,,,,( 212222111211 nnnnnn aaaaaaaaa LLLL=αω ,        (21) 
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We rewrite the payoff matrix playerβ  as follows vector form 
),,,,,,,,,,( 212221212111 nnnnnn aaaaaaaaa LLLL=βω .        (22) 
Without loss of generality, assuming that nnaa ≥11 , game ),( 11 βα  is mutual full cooperation, 
and game ),( nn βα  is full noncooperation. 
Mischief and extortion.  Extortion factorλ : if there exist constant 1≥λ ，such that， 
njaaaa nnjnnj ,,3,2,0)( 11 L=≤−−− λ ,                     (23) 
njniaaaa nnjinnij ,,2,1,1,,3,2,0)( LL =−=≥−−− λ ,        (24) 
1,,2,1,0)( −=≥−−− njaaaa nnjnnnnj Lλ ,                  (25) 
Then factorλ  is called an extortion factor of this game. 
Next, what if playerα  attempts to enforce an extortionate share of payoffs larger than the 
mutual full noncooperation value nna ? Playerα  can do this by choosing 
 )]1()1[( nnnn aap −−−= βα ωλωθ ,                     (26) 
where 1≥λ  is the extortion factor. Solving these equations for the p’s gives 
     
0
)]([
)]([
)]([
)]([
)]([
)]([
)]([1
)]([1
))(1(1
111)1(
222)1(
111)1(
222
22222
12211
11
21122
111
=
−−−=
−−−=
−−−=
−−−=
−−−=
−−−=
−−−+=
−−−+=
−−−=
−−−+−
+−
+−
+
+
nn
nnnnnnnnnnn
nnnnnnnn
nnnnnnnn
nnnnnnn
nnnnn
nnnnn
nnnnnnn
nnnn
nn
p
aaaap
aaaap
aaaap
aaaap
aaaap
aaaap
aaaap
aaaap
aap
λθ
λθ
λθ
λθ
λθ
λθ
λθ
λθ
λθ
M
M
M
M
.             (27) 
Evidently, feasible strategies exist for extortion factor λ  and sufficiently small θ . 
If 2=n , from Eq.(23), Eq.(24) and Eq.(25), extortion factor 1≥λ ，such that， 
0)( 22212212 ≤−−− aaaa λ ，                    (28) 
0)( 22122221 ≥−−− aaaa λ .                     (29) 
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 From Eq.(27),  we see that, for 2=n ,  
0
)]([
)]([1
))(1(1
22
221222213
222122122
22111
=
−−−=
−−−+=
−−−=
p
aaaap
aaaap
aap
λθ
λθ
λθ
.                 (30) 
The Snowdrift game, the Hawk–Dove game and the Chicken game can reduce to the following 
symmetric game with payoff matrix  
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−
01
11
r
r
,                                 (31) 
where r  is called the profit and loss ratio. From Eq.(28) and Eq.(29), if 1≥r , for any real 
number 1≥λ , it is an extortion factor; If 10 << r , the extortion factor λ satisfies 
r
r
−
+≤≤
1
11 λ . Now Eq.(30) can be shown that 
0
)]1(1[
]1)1[(1
)1(1
22
3
2
1
=
−−+=
−++−=
−−=
p
rrp
rp
p
λθ
λλθ
λθ
.                         (32) 
From Eq.(18), we know that 
βα λϖϖ = .                                 (33) 
Under the extortionate strategy, althoughα ’s score depends on β ’s strategy q,  the average 
payoff of α  is λ  times the average payoff ofβ . 
 
4 Conclusions 
Press and Dyson have fundamentally changed the viewpoint on the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Although their discovery makes us both excited and worried since a selfish person seems to have a 
more powerful mathematical tool to extort payoffs from those kindhearted and simpleminded 
people, it has influenced the way we think about the world. The study of zero-determinant 
strategies enables exciting new perspectives in the study of iterated multi-strategy games. The 
paper develops a theory for ZD strategies for multi-strategy games, with any number of strategies. 
We give a feasible condition of ZD strategies in multi-strategy games and a feasible extortion 
factor of symmetric games. The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the 
case of two-strategy games. The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game, the Hawk–Dove 
game and the Chicken game. Zero-determinant strategies in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma can be 
seen as degenerate case of our results.  
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